raft snapshot restore is a privileged operation - unsealing alone isn't
enough, it needs an authenticated token. Missed this on first pass, caught
live: 'Code: 403. Errors: * permission denied'.
First run: uses the throwaway init's own fresh root token. Steady state
(already restored at least once): uses a copy of home's real root token,
which becomes valid on this Vault the moment the first restore completes
(its auth data becomes byte-for-byte home's as of that snapshot). Stored
the same way as the unseal key - kubectl directly on the VPS, not git.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
StatefulSet pod naming follows the Helm release name (vps-vault, matching
the ArgoCD Application name), not the chart's default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Single-node Vault (raft storage, standalone mode) plus a restore CronJob
that pulls the latest raft snapshot from the VPS's own local MinIO
(already receiving snapshots every 6h from home) and restores it every
6h, offset 30 minutes after the home-side snapshot job.
Not an independent root of trust: raft snapshot restore replaces the
entire storage backend including the keyring, so after every restore
this Vault is sealed with HOME's actual keyring - unsealing it needs a
copy of home's real unseal key, stored directly on the VPS cluster
(kubectl, not git, same pattern as vps-minio-root-secret). First-run
bootstrap uses a throwaway single-Shamir-key init just to get through
the very first restore, then is irrelevant from then on.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
