Files
Scooby HuskyandClaude Sonnet 5 3226169af8 Fix Vault kubernetes-auth reviewer token expiring 1hr after every boot
vault-init-and-store.sh minted the auth/kubernetes/config reviewer JWT via
'kubectl create token vault-auth' with no --duration, defaulting to a 1hr
TTL, then wrote it into Vault as a static token_reviewer_jwt. ~1hr after
every cluster boot/hook rerun it silently expired, breaking TokenReview
for every kubernetes-auth login (including ESO's) with a generic 403 that
logged nothing at INFO/ERROR. This was the actual root cause of today's
broad ArgoCD Degraded wave across ~14 apps - not Vault's seal state, which
was fine the whole time.

Fix: clear token_reviewer_jwt and rely on Vault's local-JWT auto-detection
(disable_local_ca_jwt=false default), which reads the vault pod's own
kubelet-refreshed SA token from disk on every call instead of a static
copy. The vault SA already has system:auth-delegator via the existing
vault-server-binding ClusterRoleBinding.

Applied live directly against Vault to unblock immediately; confirmed
ClusterSecretStore vault-backend flipped to Ready=True and previously
broken ExternalSecrets (guacamole, teslamate, unpoller, netbird x3) all
resynced successfully.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 18:19:13 -05:00

206 lines
9.1 KiB
YAML

apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: vault-init-script
namespace: vault
data:
vault-init-and-store.sh: |
#!/bin/bash
set -euo pipefail
# === Vault Auto-Init and Store Script (ArgoCD Job Version) ===
# Adapted from Homelabv5/scripts/vault-init-and-store.sh
# Runs inside a Job pod with kubectl access via ServiceAccount.
# Uses kubectl exec to interact with the vault-0 pod directly
# instead of port-forwarding + local vault CLI.
VAULT_NS="${VAULT_NS:-vault}"
SECRET_NAME="${SECRET_NAME:-vault-init-keys}"
KV_MOUNT="${KV_MOUNT:-secret}"
JOB_NS_FOR_ROLE="${JOB_NS_FOR_ROLE:-auth-proxy}"
JOB_SA_FOR_ROLE="${JOB_SA_FOR_ROLE:-oauth2-bootstrap}"
POLICY_NAME="${POLICY_NAME:-oauth2-writer}"
ROLE_NAME="${ROLE_NAME:-eso-writer}"
VAULT_POD="vault-0"
# Helper: run vault CLI inside the vault pod
vault_exec() {
# -i forwards stdin - needed for the heredoc-piped `vault policy write
# NAME -` call below. Without it, `kubectl exec` never passes stdin
# through and vault sees an empty policy body. This was unreachable
# until the init-detection fix above (the script always failed earlier,
# every run, before ever getting this far).
kubectl -n "$VAULT_NS" exec -i "$VAULT_POD" -- env VAULT_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200 vault "$@"
}
# --- Wait for vault-0 pod to be ready ---
echo "==> Waiting for vault-0 pod to be running..."
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
PHASE=$(kubectl -n "$VAULT_NS" get pod "$VAULT_POD" -o jsonpath='{.status.phase}' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
if [ "$PHASE" = "Running" ]; then
echo " vault-0 is running"
break
fi
echo " waiting for vault-0... (attempt $i/60, phase=$PHASE)"
sleep 5
done
# Give Vault a moment to start its listener
sleep 5
# --- Check init/seal status ---
# `vault status` legitimately exits non-zero for normal states (2 = sealed,
# still prints valid JSON) as well as real failures (1 = can't connect, no
# output). The old `|| echo '{}'` fallback couldn't tell those apart - it
# discarded valid "already initialized, just sealed" JSON on exit 2 too,
# which made this script wrongly conclude "not initialized" and attempt to
# re-init an already-initialized Vault (always fails: "Vault is already
# initialized"). Only fall back to {} when there's truly no output.
echo "==> Checking Vault status..."
status_json="$(vault_exec status -format=json 2>/dev/null)"
if [ -z "$status_json" ]; then
status_json="{}"
fi
# jq, not grep/cut - `vault status -format=json` pretty-prints with a space
# after each colon ("initialized": true), which the old grep -o
# '"initialized":[a-z]*' pattern never matched (no space in the pattern) -
# initialized/sealed silently parsed as empty strings on every run
# regardless of actual Vault state, which is the real reason this script
# always tried to re-init an already-initialized Vault.
initialized="$(echo "$status_json" | jq -r '.initialized // empty')"
sealed="$(echo "$status_json" | jq -r '.sealed // empty')"
root_token=""
unseal_key=""
# Pull existing secret if present
if kubectl -n "$VAULT_NS" get secret "$SECRET_NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
root_token="$(kubectl -n "$VAULT_NS" get secret "$SECRET_NAME" -o jsonpath='{.data.VAULT_ROOT_TOKEN}' | base64 -d || true)"
unseal_key="$(kubectl -n "$VAULT_NS" get secret "$SECRET_NAME" -o jsonpath='{.data.VAULT_UNSEAL_KEY}' | base64 -d || true)"
fi
# Initialize if needed
if [ "$initialized" != "true" ]; then
echo "==> Vault not initialized; initializing..."
init_json="$(vault_exec operator init -key-shares=1 -key-threshold=1 -format=json)"
root_token="$(echo "$init_json" | grep -o '"root_token":"[^"]*"' | cut -d'"' -f4)"
unseal_key="$(echo "$init_json" | grep -o '"unseal_keys_b64":\["[^"]*"\]' | grep -o '\["[^"]*"\]' | tr -d '[]"')"
sealed="true"
echo "==> Storing root token & unseal key in Secret ${VAULT_NS}/${SECRET_NAME}"
kubectl -n "$VAULT_NS" create secret generic "$SECRET_NAME" \
--from-literal=VAULT_ROOT_TOKEN="$root_token" \
--from-literal=VAULT_UNSEAL_KEY="$unseal_key" \
--dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f -
else
echo "==> Vault already initialized."
fi
# Unseal if needed
if [ "$sealed" = "true" ]; then
if [ -z "$unseal_key" ]; then
echo "ERROR: Vault is sealed and no unseal key available"
exit 1
fi
echo "==> Unsealing..."
vault_exec operator unseal "$unseal_key" >/dev/null
fi
# Login
if [ -z "$root_token" ]; then
echo "==> Reading root token from Secret..."
root_token="$(kubectl -n "$VAULT_NS" get secret "$SECRET_NAME" -o jsonpath='{.data.VAULT_ROOT_TOKEN}' | base64 -d)"
fi
vault_exec login "$root_token" >/dev/null
# Ensure KV v2 enabled
if ! vault_exec secrets list -format=json 2>/dev/null | grep -q "\"${KV_MOUNT}/\""; then
echo "==> Enabling KV v2 at ${KV_MOUNT}/"
vault_exec secrets enable -path="$KV_MOUNT" -version=2 kv >/dev/null
fi
# Configure Kubernetes auth using Vault's own pod identity as the
# TokenReview reviewer, rather than a manually-minted static token.
#
# BUG (found 2026-08-17, live cluster ~2hrs after boot): this used to do
# `kubectl create token vault-auth` with no --duration, which defaults to
# a 1-hour TTL, then wrote that JWT into auth/kubernetes/config as a
# static token_reviewer_jwt. ~1hr after every cluster boot / hook rerun,
# that token silently expired, so Vault's TokenReview calls (used by
# EVERY kubernetes-auth login, including ESO's) started failing k8s-side
# with 401 - which Vault surfaces to callers as a generic, unhelpful
# "permission denied" 403 on /auth/kubernetes/login, with nothing logged
# at INFO/ERROR. This cascaded into ClusterSecretStore vault-backend
# going InvalidProviderConfig and every ExternalSecret in the cluster
# failing to sync - the real cause behind a broad ArgoCD "Degraded" wave
# that had nothing to do with Vault's seal state (which was fine).
#
# Fix: leave token_reviewer_jwt unset (explicitly cleared below).
# disable_local_ca_jwt defaults to false, so Vault falls back to reading
# its own pod's projected SA token from disk on every TokenReview call -
# that token is auto-refreshed by kubelet for the life of the pod, so
# there's nothing to expire. The vault pods' own SA ("vault", not
# "vault-auth") already carries system:auth-delegator via the existing
# vault-server-binding ClusterRoleBinding, so no separate reviewer SA is
# needed at all - the vault-auth SA/binding below is now unused, kept
# only so an old cluster doesn't need manual cleanup.
kube_ca="$(kubectl -n kube-system get configmap kube-root-ca.crt -o jsonpath='{.data.ca\.crt}')"
kube_host="https://kubernetes.default.svc:443"
vault_exec auth enable kubernetes >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
vault_exec write auth/kubernetes/config \
token_reviewer_jwt="" \
kubernetes_host="$kube_host" \
kubernetes_ca_cert="$kube_ca" \
disable_local_ca_jwt=false >/dev/null
# Policy + role for ESO/oauth2 job
vault_exec policy write "$POLICY_NAME" - >/dev/null <<'HCL'
path "secret/data/*" {
capabilities = ["create", "update", "read", "list"]
}
path "secret/metadata/*" {
capabilities = ["create", "update", "read", "list"]
}
HCL
vault_exec write "auth/kubernetes/role/${ROLE_NAME}" \
bound_service_account_names="${JOB_SA_FOR_ROLE},external-secrets" \
bound_service_account_namespaces="${JOB_NS_FOR_ROLE},external-secrets" \
policies="${POLICY_NAME}" \
ttl="24h" >/dev/null
# --- OIDC Auth (Authentik SSO) ---
OIDC_CLIENT_ID="9816a5ae7e7914b5d18f4ab939d011a98f8c8d6b3bb6777c46431afa06ac4a85"
OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET="ed2ba1c6378c7a46341b5162f39a7fab80e37596b01ed387c3719e8e0040344cf1daa307476c2e7a7f75041b3979275b1ebf00bb8bad94c864b4a38ded544f7b"
OIDC_DISCOVERY_URL="https://auth.kube.huskypup.net/application/o/vault/"
echo "==> Configuring OIDC auth (Authentik)..."
vault_exec auth enable oidc >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
vault_exec write auth/oidc/config \
oidc_discovery_url="$OIDC_DISCOVERY_URL" \
oidc_client_id="$OIDC_CLIENT_ID" \
oidc_client_secret="$OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET" \
default_role="default" >/dev/null
vault_exec policy write vault-admin - >/dev/null <<'HCL'
path "*" {
capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete", "list", "sudo"]
}
HCL
vault_exec write auth/oidc/role/default \
user_claim="sub" \
allowed_redirect_uris="https://vault.kube.huskypup.net/ui/vault/auth/oidc/oidc/callback,http://localhost:8250/oidc/callback" \
policies="vault-admin" \
oidc_scopes="openid,email,profile" \
token_ttl="1h" >/dev/null
echo "==> Done."
echo "K8s Secret with init creds: ${VAULT_NS}/${SECRET_NAME}"
echo "IMPORTANT: back these up securely and delete the Secret when you're comfortable:"
echo " kubectl -n ${VAULT_NS} delete secret ${SECRET_NAME}"